

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 23MAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:PCF:rkp
5750
4 January 1980

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31
(2) Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Subj: Command Chronology, Period of 1 July 1979 to 31 December 1979
Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1D
(b) WgO 5750.1B
(c) GruO 5750.1A
Encl: (1) Tyndall Detachment (9-13 July), After Action Report
(2) MAG-31 msg 181130Z Aug79
(3) Tyndall Detachment(25-30 November 1979) After Action Report
(4) Eplin Detachment(1-8 December 1979) After Action Report

1. Organizational Data

a. Designation and Location

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort
South Carolina 29902

b. Period Covered

1 July 1979 through 31 December 1979

c. Command and Staff

Commanding Officer	LtCol P. J. JONES 1 July - 31 December 1979
Executive Officer	Major A. FITCH III 1 July - 28 September 1979 Major R. L. THACKER 29 September - 31 December 1979
Administrative Officer	Captain J. M. CLUELOW 1 July - 31 October 1979 1/Lt C. J. BRAMMER 1 November - 31 December 1979

ENCLOSURE (5)

V.M.F.A. - 251

1979

Intelligence Officer

1/Lt J. R. RUCKRIEGEL
1 July - 31 October 1979
1/Lt R. R. BRIDGEMAN
1 November - 31 December 1979

Operations Officer

Major E. A. SAUNDERS
1 July - 10 December 1979
Major P. C. FARMER
11 December - 31 December 1979

Logistics Officer

1/Lt C. J. BRAMMER
1 July - 31 October 1979
1/Lt J. R. RUCKRIEGEL
1 November - 31 December 1979

Aircraft Maintenance Officer

Major W. R. SEAGRAVES
1 July - 31 December 1979

Sergeant Major

SgtMaj D. WASHINGTON
1 July - 31 December 1979

d. Average Monthly Squadron Strength

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
July	25	190
August	25	195
September	25	194
October	24	185
November	25	191
December	25	202

2. Sequence of Events

a. July

(1) VMFA-251 flew 234.7 hours/150 sorties; 45.2 hours/31 sorties were Air-to-Ground, 97.8 hours/96 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 1 July, VMFA-251 assumed duties as the MAG-31/2dMAW NORAD augmentation unit for the 20th NORAD Region.

(3) 9-13 July, Fighter Weapons detachment at Tyndall AFB, Florida.

b. August

(1) VMFA-251 flew 294.7 hours/184 sorties; 126.2 hours/79 sorties were Air-to-Ground, 20.1 hours/13 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 5 August, WTI 2-79 nominees, Captains J. J. HILL and J. O. MARTHLJOHNI left for MCAS, Yuma.

(3) 9 August, VMFA-251 participated in AVELEX 3-79.

(4) 17 August, 2 of the squadron's F-4S aircraft were flown to MCAS, Yuma in support of WTI 2-79.

c. September

(1) VMFA-251 flew 231.6 hours/150 sorties; 6.2 hours/4 sorties were Air-to-Ground, 68.9 hours/48 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 2 September, VMFA-251 lost two aircrew members, Captains J. J. HILL and J. O. MARTHILJOHNI, and one F-4S aircraft, BuNo 155562, during a training sortie at MCAS, Yuma during WTI Course 2-79.

(3) 4 September, VMFA-251 evacuated four of its aircraft to a refuge as a precaution with the approach of Hurricane David.

(4) 7 September, the last Hurrevac aircraft returned to MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.

d. October

(1) VMFA-251 flew 257.6 hours/194 sorties; 12.1 hours/8 sorties were Air-to-Ground, 127.9 hours/106 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 9 October, 2 crews began FCLP workups with VMFA-115 in preparation for Carrier Qualification.

(3) 22-26 October, VMFA-251 participated in NORAD Exercise FEDERAL INDIAN/AMALGAM CHIEF/SNOWTIME 80-1.

(4) 31 October, 1/Lt M. W. WHITTED was certified as an Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI) by MAWTS-1 personnel.

e. November

(1) VMFA-251 flew 300.3 hours/225 sorties; 175.7 hours/140 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 1 November, 1/Lt W. R. PHILLIPS was certified as an Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI) by MAWTS-1 personnel.

(3) 15 and 22 November, VMFA-251 provided adversary aircraft for 20th NORAD Region F-106 aircraft in support of Level Five Training.

(4) 16 November, 2 aircrews, Captain W. P. LANNERT/1/Lt R. BROSCHE and 1/Lt D. A. LAW/1/Lt J. J. KIRK, attached to VMFA-115, completed Carrier Qualification training aboard USS Eisenhower CVN-69.

(5) 19 November, VMFA-251 received its first F-4S with leading edge slats.

(6) 25-30 November, Fighter Weapons detachment at Tyndall AFB, Florida.

f. December

(1) VMFA-251 flew 260.0 hours/181 sorties; 28.5 hours/20 sorties were Air-to-Ground, 71.9 hours/54 sorties were Fighter Weapons.

(2) 1-8 December, Fighter Weapons detachment at Eglin AFB, Florida.

(3) 12 and 19 December, VMFA-251 provided adversary aircraft for 20th NORAD Region F-106 aircraft in support of Level Five Training.

3. Narrative Summary

VMFA-251 began the second half of the year with 9 F-4S aircraft though actual readiness was reduced due to the Fleet wide fuel leak problem. The emphasis for the months that followed was on maintaining full systems capable aircraft while conducting training which would raise the combat readiness of the squadrons crews and upgrade the training base. This training, primarily in Air to Air Warfare and Ground Attack missions was consistent with the squadron's mission; to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft under all-weather conditions, attack and destroy surface targets and conduct such other air operations as may be directed.

Initial training focused on aircrew proficiency in intercept geometry and fighter tactics. On 9 July, a detachment of 4 F-4S aircraft from the squadron began operations as adversary aircraft for F-106 crews assigned to the USAF Interceptor Weapons School. The deployment to Tyndall AFB, Florida, provided valuable training in VIDs, FAE and multi-aircraft DACT for 8 of this squadrons crews. The opportunity to operate on the ACMI further enhanced the training due to the enrichment of debriefing which it provides. During this same period, VMFA-251 began to phase in as the newly assigned FMFLant Augmentation unit to the 20th NORAD Region. Aircrews received briefings on the NORAD system and telecommunication and alert equipment was installed at the squadron. The only problem incurred during the period was the continuation of the on site NARF repair of the squadrons F-4S aircraft. This rework of the inner wing fuel cells was brought about by the massive wing fuel leaks discovered during the squadrons Yuma deployment in May.

Realizing the multi-mission role of the F-4, training focus shifted to Air to Ground missions during August with almost one half of the total flight hours and sorties flown in pursuit of increased readiness for this role. Emphasis was placed on the high threat environment and the tactics required for successful mission accomplishment. On 5 August, one crew, Captain J. O. MARTHILJOHNI (pilot) and Captain J. J. HILL (RIO) departed for MCAS, Yuma and MAWTS-1. Their attendance at WTI Course 2-79 was aimed at upgrading the squadrons training base and providing a bank of current knowledge and tactics for use in training the squadrons less experienced crews. Two of the squadrons F-4S aircraft left for MCAS, Yuma on 17 August. These aircraft were assigned to MAWTS-1, as directed by CMC, for use in the WTI 2-79 course. AVELEX 3-79 was conducted at MCAS, Beaufort on 9 August with briefings and rehearsals on 7 and 8 August. The AVELEX

which provided for the exercise of all functions of Marine Aviation was viewed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. VMFA-251 provided 2 interceptor aircraft and 2 strike aircraft for the mission.

Aircrew Combat Readiness Training was planned for the month of September with multiple types of missions flown to update and refresh crew qualifications. On 2 September however, VMFA-251 lost one of its F-4S aircraft, Bureau Number 155562, and the aircrew, Captains HILL and MARTHILJOHNI during a Low Altitude Tactics training flight at MCAS, Yuma. The mission was being conducted as a part of the WTI 2-79 course at MAWTS-1. The approach of Hurricane David forced the evacuation of 4 of the squadrons F-4S aircraft to MCAS, Yuma on 4 September with the last aircraft returning to base at Beaufort on 7 September. The squadron did realize a slight highlight during the month as the final F-4S was inducted into the NARF fuel leak rework program thereby increasing the squadrons operational readiness.

October was dedicated almost entirely to the preparation of crews for the MAWTS-1 Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACT(I)) certification course which was conducted at Beaufort during the final week of the month. Fighter Weapons sorties of all types were flown against F-4, A-4 and F-15 adversaries. In addition to the Fighter Weapons workups, 2 crews from VMFA-251, Captain LANNERT/1/Lt BROSCHART and 1/Lt LAW/1/Lt KIRK, began an FCLP workup and lecture series with VMFA-115 in preparation for Carrier Qualification. Captain LANNERT also served as an assistant Landing Signal Officer, continuing his training in this specialty. During the period 22-26 October, VMFA-251 provided 4 F-4S aircraft which operated out of MCAS, Beaufort in support of NORAD Exercise Federal Indian/Amalgam Chief/Snowtime 80-1. These night intercept missions against ECM capable aircraft provided valuable training for the squadron. On 31 October, 1/Lt M. W. WHITED was designated an ACT(I) by MAWTS-1 personnel following a series of evaluation flights.

The emphasis on Fighter Tactics was continued into November as the MAWTS-1 ACT(I) certification continued with 1/Lt W. R. PHILLIPS being designated on 1 November. The focus on Fighter Weapons sorties throughout the month was also aimed at the deployment from 25-30 November of 6 F-4S aircraft to Tyndall AFB, Florida for DACT missions against F-106 aircraft assigned to the USAF Interceptor Weapons School. This detachment which involved 8 of the squadrons crews, as in the past, provided invaluable training against a multi-bogie threat and was enhanced due to the availability of the ACMI. Other events saw the successful Carrier Qualification of Captain LANNERT and 1/Lt BROSCHART during training aboard USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) on 16 November; 1/Lt LAW and 1/Lt KIRK received some training but were not able to complete qualification due to a lack of available deck time. 15 and 22 November found VMFA-251 beginning a now continuing program of support for 20th NORAD Region F-106 aircraft by flying as adversaries during Level Five Training missions. The increasing tempo of operations during November combined with the acceptance of the first USMC F-4S with leading edge slats on 19 November with 2 other like aircraft on board by month's end greatly enhanced the squadrons operational readiness.

The squadrons detachment of 6 F-4S aircraft at Tyndall AFB, Florida began the month of December by moving to Eglin AFB, Florida for Fighter Weapons missions with F-15 aircraft of the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing. These sorties against the high performance "Eagle" were exceptionally beneficial to squadron aircrews in bringing them experience against a "state of the art" adversary thereby requiring the optimum in tactics and employment from the 8 VMFA-251 crews that participated. Of note during the Tyndall-Eglin deployment was the initial employment of the F-4S with leading edge slats (LES) in an FMF training scenario. The LES equipped aircraft more than proved its improved handling characteristics and increased turn performance.

The receipt of the fourth F-4S with LES modifications on 11 December brought VMFA-251 to 12 on hand F-4S aircraft and even considering pending aircraft transfers of non slatted aircraft, the squadron completed this six month period with the increased combat readiness and operational capability that was our goal. The tragic loss of an aircraft and its crew not withstanding, VMFA-251 made great strides during the past six months. With the fuel leak problem behind us and, being well on the way to being the Corps' first squadron totally equipped with the slatted F-4S, VMFA-251 is prepared to do its assigned mission and, as our motto states, "Custos Caelorum", we are the Guardians of the Heavens.


P. J. JONES

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER / ATTACK SQUADRON 251
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC
MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29902

3:EAS:ja
3500
3 August 1979

From: *Commanding Officer*
To: *Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: SC-103)*
Via: *Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)*

Subj: *Tyndall Detachment (9-13 July 1979), After Action Report*

Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1

1. *In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.*

PART I. Commander's Comments

The Tyndall detachment was a unique and excellent training evolution which provided a timely evaluation of DACM, VID, and FAE tactics. It facilitated section mutual support against the F-106 Dart. Utilization of the ACMI was an absolutely invaluable element in the training process, providing a real time capability for analysis of individual and section performance. Invaluable lessons were learned during post flight ACMI evaluations and debriefings. The Interceptor Weapons School provided outstanding support and service throughout the deployment.

PART II. Data

- a. Tyndall AFB, Florida.*
- b. 9 July 1979 to 13 July 1979.*
- c. 4 aircraft.*
- d. 17 officers/3 enco's/16 enlisted.*
- e. DACM, VID, and FAE tactics training. Average CRP increase - 1.4% per aircraft member.*
- f. Deployment/retrograde:
20.1 day/3.8 night/4.7 instrument*
*In place:
25.8 day/0.0 night/7.7 instrument*

ENCLOSURE (1)

g. Deployment/retrograde - 22 sorties
FW Syllabus - 26 "R" sorties
FW Syllabus - 26 "S" sorties

h. 125 Bundles Chaff/25 Flares

i. W-151

PART III. Problems encountered/Lessons Learned/Recommendations

a. All administration arrangements were satisfactory.

b. No input.

c. Tactical training at Tyndall accounted for 28 sorties and 25.8 hours. Fourteen sorties were lost due to the inclement weather from Hurricane Bob. The average CRP increase was 1.4% for both RIO and Pilot. Each aircrewmember flew an average of 4 tactical sorties in the deployment. The flying was well planned and coordinated and provided excellent training for the aircrews.

d. A supply representative from MAG-31 Supply was augmented to take care of supply items. The single most critical supply deficiency was clamp items effecting radar, specifically LRU components. The computer generated supply list from MAG-31 Squadron Service Support Section listed no LRU components for a 6 day deployment of 4 F-4S aircraft. Test equipment was deployed and the capability for determining component failure existed, but no components were available. Therefore, cannibalisation, or flight to Beaufort was necessary for LRU component failures. Only 15 of 65 components in the regime of pool, clamp items and "A" stores were received.

e. All personnel and the entire supply pack-up to support 4 F-4S aircraft for six days, adequately transported via POV.

f. Eighteen enlisted personnel and one officer were tasked to provide maintenance functions. This number of personnel proved to be adequate for the concept of operations. All maintenance functions were performed expeditiously and in a professional manner.

g. No ordnance loading was performed at Tyndall AFB. Chaff and Flares were loaded at Beaufort and were replenished during the mid-deployment aircrew change.

h. Fuel servicing via job control was expeditious. Vehicles for on-base transportation were provided by the Deployment Liaison Office. These outstanding services provided answers to time honored problems.


i. The Deployment Liaison Office, Tyndall AFB, is to be commended for their professionalism and cooperative assistance throughout the Deployment.

P. J. JONES

NAVAL MESSAGE

TO: DE/344 705-4001

DRAFTED BY COL J. J. SCHUBER		PHONE EXT NR 300/309	PAGE 1 OF 2	PAGES 2		
DATE 17 Aug 1979	TOP/TOD	ROUTED BY 382	CHECKED BY [Signature]			
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP 18 11 30	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION				XXXX
		INFO				



SQUADRON FILE COPY

FM: MAG THREE ONE
 TO: VMFA ONE TWO TWO
 VMFA ONE ONE FIVE
 VMFA TWO FIVE ONE
 VMFA THREE THREE THREE
 HAMS THREE ONE

ROUTE	INITIALS
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AdminO	
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IntelO	
A/C MaintO	
SGT. MAJ.	
ASO.	[Signature]
FILE	

BT

UNCLAS//NO1600//

AVELEX 2-79

A. CMC 101028Z AUG 79 TO CG 2DMAW

1. THE SUCCESSFUL PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AVELEX 2-79 WAS OUTSTANDING. CONSIDERING THE SHORT FUZED WARNING ORDER, THE LATE FRAG AND CHOP OF PARTICIPATING UNITS, THE GEOGRAPHICAL SEPARATION OF THESE UNITS BY AS MUCH AS 250 MILES AND THE LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN SCENARIO, THE SUBSEQUENT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE AVELEX 2-79 TRAINING GOALS WAS NOTHING SHORT OF A SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL MARINE INVOLVED.

2. REF (A) IS QUOTED IN PART FOR YOUR INFO: "YOUR AVELEX THURSDAY AFTERNOON AT BEAUFORT WAS MOST IMPRESSIVE. SO, TOO, WERE ALL OF THOSE WHO MADE IT HAPPEN. PLEASE CONVEY MY SINCEREST THANKS AND ADMIRATION....." GENERAL R. H. BARROW, USMC, COMMANDANT OF MARINE CORPS.

18

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP

NAVAL MESSAGE

OPNAV FORM 1008 (REV 3 69) (N 01) 7054

RELEASED BY LTCOL P. J. SCHOBER		DRAFTED BY COL J.P. MONROE JR		PHONE EXT NR 300/309		PAGE 2	PAGE 2
07 AUG 1979		ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY			
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	
		ACTION					
		INFO					

3. I AM PROUD TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH AND TO WORK WITH THE MARINES ON THE GROUP STAFF WHO DID THE PLANNING AND THE MARINES IN THE SQUADRONS THAT EXECUTED THESE PLANS FOR AVELEX 2-79. THANKS FOR A JOB WELL DONE. YOU ARE MY KIND OF FIGHTER GROUP. COL J.P. MONROE, JR., COMMANDING.

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:PCF:rkp
3500
4 January 1980

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)
Subj: Tyndall Detachment (25-30 November 1979) After Action Report
Ref: (a) WgO 3502,1

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

PART I. Commander's Comments

The Tyndall detachment was a unique and excellent training evolution which provided a timely evaluation of DACM, VID, and FAE tactics. It facilitated prior training goals by allowing a test of section mutual support against the F-106 Dart. Utilization of the ACMI (now ACTES) was an absolutely invaluable element in the training process, providing a real time capability for analysis of individual and section performance. The videotape system greatly enriched the debriefing and enhanced the total training process via more lessons learned per sortie. The Interceptor Weapons School provided outstanding support and service throughout the deployment.

PART II. Data

- a. Tyndall AFB, Florida.
- b. 25 November 1979 to 30 November 1979.
- c. 6 F-4S aircraft.
- d. 23 officers/6 SNCO's/42 enlisted.
- e. DACM, VID, and FAE tactics training. Average CRP increase - 3.6% per aircrew member.
- f. Deployment/retrograde:
20.7 day/6.4 night/6.1 instrument
In place:
64.8 day/3.4 night/2.1 instrument

ENCLOSURE (3)

g. Deployment/retrograde - 16 sorties
FW Syllabus - 21 "R" sorties
FW Syllabus - 32 "S" sorties

h. 288 Bundles Chaff/33 Flores

i. W-151

PART III. Problems encountered/Lessons learned

a. Personnel

(1) TAD Orders Requests

Discussion: Efficient and effective administrative procedures require some lead time, the timely submission of orders requests cannot be overstressed. Inherent to orders requests is the need to identify personnel requiring special authorization such as P.O.V. approval.

Recommendation: That existing requirements for order requests be adhered to even if deployment plans are not finalized.

(2) Orders Endorsement

Discussion: An effective measure taken during the deployment was that of orders collected and consolidated orders endorsement once on location. This processing by the deployed administrative personnel was beneficial for both the section and, all deployed personnel.

Recommendation: That consolidated orders endorsement be the SOP for any deployed unit.

b. Intelligence. No input.

c. Operations

(1) Tactical Sorties

Discussion: Tactical training at Tyndall accounted for 53 sorties scheduled and flown for a total of 64.8 hours. The average CRP increase was 3.6% for both Pilots and RIOs. Each aircrewmember flew an average of seven tactical sorties in the deployment. The flying as coordinated by the Interceptor Weapons School (IWS) was well planned and provided excellent training for the crews.

Recommendation: That future deployments in support of the IWS be scheduled.

(2) F-4S with Leading Edge Slats (LES)

Discussion: The operations at Tyndall marked the initial employment of the LES equipped F-4S in FMF training. The aircraft proved itself both via handling and performance against the F-106.

Recommendation: That every effort be made to hasten the delivery of the LES aircraft to MAG-31 and to fully equip MAG-31 units with the aircraft a squadron at a time to ensure a maximum of both operational capability and, to prevent widespread loss of flexibility.

d. Supply

(1) Supply Support

Discussion: Supply support was not required as the detachment carried its own pack-up. The MAG-31 Supply representative was not available due to administrative error, however, this was not a problem. As parts were used from the pack-up, they were replaced from home based supply assets.

Recommendation: That future detachments determine common parts utilization and ensure adequate backup. Also, that during preliaison with USAF personnel at Tyndall, that consumable item availability be determined. And, that a supply representative accompany the deployed unit.

e. Embarkation/Logistics

(1) Deployment/retrograde Transport

Discussion: Though hampered by late deployment approval and the requirement to utilize overland transportation, the deployment to Tyndall AFB was successful. Retrograde from Tyndall was in fact a deployment to Eglin AFB and as such is discussed in this units After Action Report concerning its Eglin Detachment (1-8 December 1979). The earlier approval of the squadrons deployment and, the use of SAM vice overland transport would have made for an easier deployment. This units Eglin detachment After Action Report gives an in depth analysis of events which occurred during that followon evolution which relate to this problem.

Recommendation: That timely deployment approval be given and, that SAM vice overland transport be utilized whenever possible.

(2) Box Lunches

Discussion: Box lunches received prior to deployment were unsatisfactory. The lunches contained: soft, hardboiled eggs, spoiled chocolate milk, no bread, and in general 3 pieces of chicken—all wings.

Recommendation: That box lunches prepared by the MCAS, Beaufort dining facility be upgraded with regard to both quality and quantity.

(3) Service Support

Discussion: The reception of the detachments advance party was notably helpful. The DIO section helped arrange billeting. Quarters

were checked out in advance and keys were issued as the detachments main body arrived. Also, all vehicles were checked out in advance for immediate use. The billeting itself was outstanding in every way and the dining facility was rated the finest many in the detachment had ever seen. The government vehicles were in excellent repair and, considering the radios installed and with a base station in the working area, communications capabilities were greatly enhanced.

Recommendation: That detachments deploying to Tyndall AFB make prior liaison to ensure that all services are available.

f. Maintenance

(1) Aircraft Ground Equipment (AGE)

Discussion: AGE was available on the line and was always serviced and in excellent condition. The USAF M-60 (Air Start Unit) was used when the detachments NCPP-105 was out of service. This piece of equipment has a lower volume of air and requires longer start time for F-4S aircraft. A "Y" duct was used to tie 2 M-60 units together in an attempt to increase the air flow. This proved to be unsuccessful.

Recommendation: That future detachments deploy with an augment from the H&MS GSE section in order to better maintain the NCPP-105 unit. If available and transportation assets allow, an additional NCPP-105 should be included in the pack-up.

(2) Fuel Servicing

Discussion: Fuel servicing was available through Job Control. However, USAF regulations allow only 3 personnel around aircraft while refueling. On occasions, this created a problem as the rapid fuel service capability conflicted with aircraft turnaround during high tempo operations.

Recommendation: That aircraft maintenance be scheduled around fueling and operational scheduling allow for the increased ground time.

(3) Nitrogen Servicing

Discussion: Tyndall AFB does not have facilities to re-service nitrogen carts. The deploying unit must take sufficient nitrogen to last for the deployment or, be prepared to transport the nitrogen carts to Eglin AFB for servicing.

Recommendation: That sufficient nitrogen be taken to last the deployment.

g. Ordnance. The unit expended 288 bundles of chaff/33 flares. No ordnance loading took place at Tyndall AFB. All aircraft were deployed with a full load of chaff and flares. Replacement aircraft ferried to Tyndall were similarly equipped.

h. Facilities

(1) ACMI

Discussion: The ACMI operated by the IWS at Tyndall AFB provides an enrichment to debriefing and so enhances the training accomplished via its pictorial display (videotape) of the sortie that the lessons learned are deeply etched on the crews.

Recommendation: That every effort be made to obtain a similar training range for use in the Beaufort operating areas. Given that this will be a timely and costly process however, every effort should be made to allow deployments to Tyndall AFB and use of the ACMI there.



P. C. FARMER
By direction

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2dMAW, FMFLant
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29902

3:PCF:rkp
3500
4 January 1980

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing (Attn: SC-103)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (Attn: S-3)

Subj: Eglin Detachment (1-8 December 1979) After Action Report

Ref: (a) WgO 3502.1

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

PART I. Commander's Comments

The Eglin detachment provided an exceptional opportunity for follow-on training after leaving Tyndall AFB. Squadron crews, who after rethinking and refining their tactics at Tyndall, had the opportunity to test their newly gained knowledge against a true "state of the art" adversary as provided by the F-15 Eagles of the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW). These sorties required the optimum in tactics and employment from our crews and provided for the utmost realism in training. The deployment also allowed a more in depth analysis of the squadrons new F-4S with leading edge slats (LES). The LES aircraft proved a worthy opponent for the Eagle and, demonstrated clearly its improved handling characteristics and increased turn performance. Services and support provided by the 33rd TFW and the host unit, the 59th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) were outstanding throughout the deployment.

PART II. Data

- a. Eglin AFB, Florida.
- b. 1 December 1979 to 8 December 1979.
- c. 6 F-4S aircraft.
- d. 23 officers/6 SNCO's/42 enlisted.
- e. DACM, VID, and FAE tactics training. Average CRP increase - 1.5% per aircrew member.
- f. Deployment/retrograde:
42.2 day/9.1 night/6.9 instrument

In place:
32.7 day/0.0 night/3.2 instrument

ENCLOSURE (4)

g. Deployment/retrograde - 29 sorties
FW Syllabus - 15 "R" sorties
FW Syllabus - 11 "S" sorties

h. None

i. W-151

PART III. Problems encountered/Lessons learned.

a. Personnel. All administrative arrangements were satisfactory.

b. Intelligence

(1) Flight Line Security

Discussion: Eglin AFB is extremely security conscious. All personnel must carry their I.D. cards at all times, Air Police spot checks are common. To enter the Flight Line, only three authorized points are available; entry from any other point is a violation. All aircraft engine runs, towing and aircraft taxi operations must be coordinated through Job Control or Ground Control. If not authorized, the Air Police will stop the evolution.

Recommendation: Prior to Eglin deployment, a complete Security S.O.P. should be obtained and reviewed.

c. Operations

(1) Tactical Sorties

Discussion: Tactical training at Eglin accounted for 26 sorties and 32.7 hours. 14 sorties were lost due to inclement weather and 8 sorties were lost due to aircraft unserviceability. The average CRP increase was 1.5% for both Pilots and RIOs. Each aircrewmember flew an average of 3 sorties. The flying as coordinated by the 33rd TFW was well planned and executed.

Recommendation: Further deployments to Eglin AFB for DACT with the F-15 Eagles of the 33rd TFW should be explored to the utmost extent.

d. Supply

(1) Supply Support

Discussion: Supply support was not required as the detachment carried its own supplies. On several occasions, it was necessary to use the USAF bench stock for consumables. USAF personnel were receptive and assisted in location of the proper items.

Recommendation: That future detachments carry a parts inventory but that in depth predeployment liaison be made to determine degree/depth of USAF on site supply capability.

e. Embarkation/Logistics

(1) Predeployment Liaison

Discussion: A liaison trip from Tyndall AFB was made and proved invaluable in finalizing plans for support and services. This conference also revealed some of the heretofore unknown security requirements addressed in paragraph b. above.

Recommendation: That on site liaison visits be made for any deployment no matter how small or routine the detachment may be.

(2) Service Support

Discussion: The reception of the detachment was well organized, with personnel and equipment waiting to off load the pack-up. The working spaces were considered excellent. Billeting was excellent and assistance on every matter was available. The dining facilities on both main side and T.A.C. side served excellent meals in a pleasant, relaxed atmosphere.

Recommendation: That all detachments to Eglin make prior coordination to ensure availability of all services.

(3) Vehicular Support

Discussion: Government vehicles were provided to include a bus to shuttle personnel from quarters to the working area. The vehicles were in excellent condition. The one problem which arose was that of a bus driver, maintenance personnel had to be used in this role.

Recommendation: That future deployments request a bus driver from MWSG-27 Det. B or MABS-31. The driver can then check out the bus and free maintenance personnel for work.

(4) Deployment/Retrograde Transport

Discussion: As the Eglin deployment was tied to the deployment to Tyndall AFB and even more tenuous in nature due to possible nonavailability of 33rd TFW F-15s for DACT, the late approval of deployment coupled with the use of overland transport which requires many more agencies to be involved for coordination caused problems in both deployment to Eglin (from Tyndall AFB) and, return to MCAS, Beaufort. When the detachment was ready to move from Tyndall to Eglin, arrangements were not complete with the Tyndall TMO. Only the efforts of the personnel at Tyndall TMO to secure USAF trucks and buses which moved the detachment, at no cost to the USMC, prevented a potentially embarrassing situation. The plan for retrograde from Eglin to Beaufort was similarly incomplete. Again, only the timely

efforts of the Eglin TMO allowed the detachment to move out as planned.

Recommendation: That SAM should be utilized for all possible deployment/retrograde evolutions. The failure to require its use and exercise its capabilities does not and will not point out our requirements for additional assets or, shortfalls of those in existence. The reasons behind the late approval of the deployment are understandable but, due to the increase in information handling points involved in deployments via overland transport, these decisions must be timely enough to ensure feasibility from a logistical standpoint.

f. Maintenance

(1) Aircraft Ground Equipment (AGE)

Discussion: AGE was available on the line and was always serviced and in excellent condition. The USAF M-60 (Air Start Unit) was used when the detachments NCPP-105 was out of service. This piece of equipment has a lower volume of air and requires a longer start time for F-4S aircraft. A "Y" duct was used to tie 2 M-60 units together in an attempt to increase the air flow. This proved to be unsuccessful.

Recommendation: That future detachments deploy with an augment from the H&MS GSE section in order to better maintain the NCPP-105 unit. If available and transportation assets allow, an additional NCPP-105 should be included in the pack-up.

(2) Fuel Servicing

Discussion: Fuel servicing was available through Job Control. However, USAF regulations allow only 3 personnel around aircraft while refueling. On occasions, this created a problem as the rapid fuel service capability conflicted with aircraft turnaround during high tempo operations.

Recommendation: That aircraft maintenance be scheduled around fueling and operational scheduling allow for the increased ground time.

g. Ordnance. No ordnance was expended at Eglin AFB.

h. Facilities

(1) W-151

Discussion: The use of the W-151 operating area proved highly satisfactory with regard to airspace, Bingo fuels/fields, and GCI support.

Recommendation: That Eglin based operations continue to utilize the W-151 but, that attempts be made to secure range time on the ACMI and use of its debriefing capabilities for any major missions.



F. C. FARMER
By direction